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DUE PROCESS
SUPREME COURT
NEW YORK COUNTY
People v. Julio Batiz ' 0
(decided August 14, 1997)
Defendant, Julio Batiz, was indicted in May 1996 for two
counts of murder in the second degree. 31' Defendant was charged
with stabbing his victim, Thomaso Ramos, in November 1981,
causing injuries which resulted in her death in December 1981.*3
Batiz moved to dismiss this indictment claiming that the fifteen
years preindictment delay denied him due process.3 13 Defendant
argued that the inability of the police to locate eyewitnesses or
alibi witnesses, combined with the demise of many of the
investigating police officers, precluded cross-examination at
trial. 314 He further contended that he was prejudiced by the four
year delay during which time no investigation took place. 315
Following a hearing, the defendant's motion was denied. 316 The
Supreme Court, New York County, held that the charge of
murder is the "most serious offense recognized at law" and due
process is not denied since defendant's flight significantly
contributed to this delay. 317 Additionally, the court reasoned that
the defendant effectively avoided any "pretrial or preindictment"
prison term during this delay.318 Although Batiz suffered some
prejudice, a claim of prejudice alone is not sufficient to dismiss
245 N.Y. L.J., Aug. 14, 1997, 23 (Sup. Ct. New York County).
311 Id. See N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.25 (McKinney 1997). This section
states in pertinent part: "A person is guilty of murder in the second degree
when: 1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death
of such person or of a third person .... " Id.312 Batiz, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 14, 1997, at 23.
313 Id.
314Id. at 24.
3 15 Id.
316 Id. at 23-24.
317 
rd. at 24.
3 18 Id.
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the indictment especially when the delay was caused by his own
acts.319
Prior to November 1981, Detective Cahill, now deceased,
visited 2 West 111th Street following an anonymous call
informing him that he could find the person he was looking for at
this address.120 The building, the neighboring areas, and the place
of the stabbing were investigated ten to twelve times by the
detectives.32' A "wanted card" was prepared in November 1981,
containing the address, with the alias "Hernandez." 3 Although
the victim knew the defendant and that he lived in the area, the
detectives were unsuccessful in locating him in the first two
months of the investigation.3z2
In January 1982, the case was transferred to the 23rd precinct
when the lines of demarcation for the 25th and the 23rd precincts
changed .324 No action was taken on the case between January
1982 to 1986. 32 Detective Turner, now retired, investigated from
April 1986 until April 1990.326 Turner discovered that the
defendant used different names, birth dates, and social security
numbers. 327  He reissued the "wanted card" with the
"Rodriguez" alias.32 In December 1986, Turner acquired three
addresses for the defendant from records of the Department of
Motor Vehicles [hereinafter "DMV"].32 9 Between November
319 Id.
320 Id. at 23.
321 Id.
32 Id. The "wanted card" advises the detectives if the defendant is
apprehended in a different case. Id.
323 Id.
324 Id.
325 Id.
326 Id.
327 Id.
32 Id. Detective Turner visited the scene of the crime. Id. He did a "finest
check" which is "a career criminal apprehension unit that uses federal
computers to do various checks." Id. He also did a NYSIID check which
provided him with the defendant's up-to-date criminal history. Id.
329 id.
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1989 and April 1990, Turner visited these addresses more
frequently, in pursuit of a homicide arrest, to no avail.3,
Detective Rehbein investigated the case from January 1990
until the defendant's arrest in May 1996. 331 In 1995, DMV listed
the defendant's address as 620 West 135th Street.3n Defendant's
brother provided Rehbein with the defendant's van registration
number, and informed him that the defendant lived in New Jersey
on weekends, with his girlfriend. 3" The van belonged to
Charlotte Batiz, the defendant's wife, who resided at 221 West
111th Street.34
In May 1995, Rehbein discovered that the defendant was
employed by the National Housing Partnership located at 620
West 1351h Street.3 In June 1995, however, Rehbein was
informed that the defendant took a demotion on an "unspecified
date" to work in Albrightsville, Pennsylvania, with a home
address of 301 Shakespeare Drive, Pennsylvania, Post Office Box
508 .336 A Pennsylvania State Trooper agreed to make inquiries
about the occupants of the Shakespeare address after the Postal
Inspector informed Rehbein that Batiz was listed on that box, and
had picked up mail from there."
Between June 1995 and May 1996, Rehbein made five visits to
the 111th Street address, and performed a "badge" check,
330 id.
331 Id. at 23. Detective Spear, now deceased, also conducted a parallel
investigation independently. Id.
332 Id.
333 Id. The defendant's records were sent to a Passaic County detective for
verification, but he was unable to uncover any information of assistance. Id.
334Id.
335 Id. Detective Rehbein was unable to obtain any information from the
Social Security Administration or the Internal Revenue Service as they
maintain their records are confidential. Id.
336 Id. Rehbein was also informed that the defendant was fired in 1993. Id.
337 Id. The Trooper provided Rehbein with license plate numbers for three
parked cars located at that address. Id. A computer check revealed that the
cars were registered to Stewart, with one car listed at a Brooklyn address. Id.
No one was at home when Rehbein visited the Brooklyn address. Id.
1998
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another NYSIID check, and another "finest" check, to no avail.338
Defendant was arrested in April 1996 following an assault, and in
May 1996, he was arrested for murder. 39 Defendant's rap sheet
showed that a warrant was issued in February 1982 for a
probation violation, under the name of Rodriguez, and he never
responded to letters sent in connection with this violation. 34 0
Relying on People v. Singer, 41 the Batiz court recognized that a
"[l]engthy and unwarranted preindictment delay constitutes a
violation of the State's due process guarantee. "342 The statute of
limitations is primarily a suspect's protection against a prolonged
detainment before proceeding to trial. 343  However, such a
safeguard against a protracted delay does not exist when there is a
charge of murder. 34 4 Even if some prejudice was suffered by the
defendant, a dismissal may be granted only if the defendant can
show that the action was detained "without good cause," and the
prosecution maintains the burden to demonstrate good cause for
the delay.345
338 Id. A "badge check" is a "booking and arraignment system to determine
if the defendant was arrested anywhere." A "finest check" is performed by a
"career criminal apprehension unit that uses federal computers to do various
checks." Id.
"9 Id. The assault took place at East 115th Street. Id.
34' Id. Upon arrest the defendant said that he lived at 220 East 115th Street.
Id.
341 44 N.Y.2d 241, 376 N.E.2d 179, 405 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1978).
342 Batiz, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 14, 1997, at 23. See Singer, 44 N.Y.2d at 253,
376 N.E.2d at 186, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 24-25. In Singer, defendant was
incarcerated for another crime during the four year period between October
1970 and May 1974, after which he was formally charged with homicide. Id.
at 252, 376 N.E.2d at 185-86, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 24.
m' Batiz, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 14, 1997, at 23. See also People v. Fuller, 57
N.Y.2d 152, 159, 441 N.E.2d 563, 567, 455 N.Y.S.2d 253, 256 (1982). In
Fuller, defendant's unlawful conduct of grand larceny was discovered in
December 1975, but the District Attorney was not informed until December
1976. Id. at 155, 441 N.E.2d at 564, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 254. Defendant based
the due process claim on this 21-month delay. Id.
4 Batiz, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 14, 1997, at 23. See Singer, 44 N.Y.2d at 253,
376 N.E.2d at 186, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 25.
345 Batiz, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 14, 1997, at 23. See People v. Lesiuk, 81
N.Y.2d 485, 490, 617 N.E.2d 1047, 1050, 600 N.Y.S.2d 931, 934 (1993). In
972 [Vol 14
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The Singer court stated that the due process requirement under
Article 1, section 6 of the New York State Constitution to
secure prompt prosecution is more liberal than a speedy trial
guarantee pursuant to CPL 30.20,14 CPL 30.30,m8 and the Sixth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution.-" In United States v.
Lovasc&5° the United States Supreme Court held that "to prosecute
a defendant following investigative delay does not deprive him of
due process, even if his defense might have been somewhat
prejudiced by the lapse of time. 311
Lesiuk, defendant was convicted following a jury trial for sale of marihuana in
December 1986. Id. at 487, 617 N.E.2d at 1048, 600 N.Y.S.2d at 932. His
conviction was delayed until August 1987 as the undercover narcotics unit
tried to use the defendant to organize another marihuana transaction. Id. The
court denied the defendant's motion to set aside the verdict, stating that
postponement of the defendant's arrest did not constitute a deprivation of due
process. Id. at 487, 491, 617 N.E.2d at 1048, 1050, 600 N.Y.S.2d at 932,
934.
6 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. Article I, Section 6 provides: "In any trial in
any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in
person and with counsel as in civil actions and shall be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation and be confronted with the witnesses against him."
Id.
-7 N.Y. CRim. PROC. LAw § 30.20 (McKinney 1997). This section
provides: "After a criminal action is commenced, the defendant is entitled to a
speedy trial." Id.
m N.Y. CRPM. PRoc. LAw § 30.30 (McKinney 1997). Section 30.30
provides that time limitations "do not apply to a criminal action wherein the
defendant is accused of an offense defined in section... 125.25 of the penal
law." Id.
" Singer, 44 N.Y.2d at 253, 376 N.E.2d at 186, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 25. See
also U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial .... and... to be confronted with the witnesses
against him .... " Id.
3-0 431 U.S. 783 (1977).
351 Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 796. In Lovasco, the defendant was indicted for
offenses which occurred 18 months previously. Id. at 784. Oral argument
asserted that the delay "was caused by the government's efforts to identify
persons in addition to respondent who may have participated in the offenses."
Id. at 796. The Court found that due process was not violated even though
some prejudice occurred, and it would not be "fundamentally unfair" to
compel the defendant to stand trial. Id.
1998 973
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In People v. Taranovich,3 2 the New York Court of Appeals set
forth five factors which a court should consider in its
determination of denial of due process arising from a
preindictment delay.353 These factors are consistent with New
York Criminal Procedure Law Section 30.20.354 They are:
(1) the extent of the delay; (2) the reason for the
delay; (3) the nature of the underlying charge; (4)
whether or not there has been an extended period
of pretrial incarceration; and (5) whether or not
there is any indication that the defense has been
impaired by reason of the delay.355
Although a fifteen year delay is substantial, the New York
Court of Appeals has thus far refused to give a time restriction
where a criminal prosecution cannot be pursued.356  This
reluctance to set a "per se time restriction" is consistent with the
decision of the Legislature not to impose a time limit where a
murder is at issue. 357 The Batiz court held that the fifteen year
preindictment delay was not unreasonable. 358  The court stated
that it was more important to consider what was done to
apprehend the defendant, rather than the length of time the
defendant was sought after.359
352 37 N.Y.2d 442, 335 N.E.2d 303, 373 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1975).
353 Batiz, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 14, 1997, at 23 (citing Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d at
445, 335 N.E.2d at 306, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 81-82).354 Id. See N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW § 30.20 (McKinney 1996).
"I Batiz, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 14, 1997, at 23.
356 Id. at 23-24; Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d at 445, 335 N.E.2d at 306, 373
N.Y.S.2d at 82.
317 Batiz, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 14, 1997, at 24. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §
30.10(2)(a) (McKinney 1996). This provision states in pertinent part: "A
criminal action must be commenced within the period of limitation
prescribed ... except ... [a] prosecution for a class A felony may be
commenced at any time." Id.
358 Id. (citing People v. LaRocca, 172 A.D.2d 628, 568 N.Y.S.2d 431 (2d
Dep't 1991). In LaRocca, the defendant was convicted in 1985, following a
jury trial, for a murder which occurred in 1968. Id. at 628, 568 N.Y.S.2d at
431. He appealed contending bad faith by the People for not obtaining an
earlier indictment. Id. The court held that the seventeen year delay did not
deprive the defendant of due process. Id. at 628, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 432.
559Batiz, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 14 1997, at 24.
[Vol 14
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Inability to locate the defendant despite diligent efforts by the
detectives constitutes "good cause" for the delay in the
indictment. 0 The reason this delay occurred was because the
police were unable to locate Batiz.3' There was no evidence of
any action taken by the police between 1982 and 1986. 3
Although such inaction usually constitutes an undue delay, there
is no reason to contemplate that the defendant would have been
found if the investigation was active during that time.13
Defendant ceased reporting to the Department of Probation,
which was unaware of his whereabouts, and was unable to locate
him at his residence or workplace.36' A bench warrant was
subsequently issued for his arrest, in February 1982.- Since the
defendant became a fugitive, the delay "should not be attributed
to the People."3 Batiz contributed to the delay and was only
arrested because he committed another offense.3 7
11 Id. (citing People v. Staley, 41 N.Y.2d 789, 364 N.E.2d 1111, 396
N.Y.S.2d 339 (1977)). In Staley, the defendant was indicted thirty one months
after the arrest and dismissal of charges without prejudice. Id. at 790, 364
N.E.2d at 1112, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 341. The court held this constituted a
violation of due process as there was no acceptable reason or justification for
the delay. Id. at 790, 792-93, 364 N.E.2d at 1113-14, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 341-
42. The court also stated that "[d ]elays due to difficulty in obtaining sufficient
to indict or even to arrest do not mandate dismissal of charges, subject of
course to the Statute of Limitations." Id. at 792, 364 N.E.2d at 1114, 396
N.Y.S.2d at 342.
6 Batiz, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 14, 1997, at 24.
362Id.
363 Id.
M Id.
365 Id.
3 Id. (citing People v. King, 114 A.D.2d 650, 494 N.Y.S.2d 484 (3d Dep't
1985)). In King, the defendant became a fugitive following his participation in
a "temporary release program." King, 114 A.D.2d at 650, 494 N.Y.S.2d at
485. The court stated that since the 20 month delay occurred while he was a
fugitive, this "cannot be chargeable against the prosecution." Id. at 651, 494
N.Y.S.2d at 486.
367Id.
1998
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Relying on People v. Guzman,3 Batiz sought a dismissal of the
indictment based on the four year delay when he was "readily
available." '369 However, the court asserted that the defendant in
Guzman was available throughout the four year span, and fully
cooperated with the police in their investigation.370 The detectives
faced substantial difficulty in locating Batiz because of his use of
aliases, different birth dates and social security numbers, lack of
cooperation from his family, and conflicting home addresses.37'
Batiz could not be awarded with a dismissal, since the
investigation was hindered by his own attempt and actions to
evade capture; the investigators made an assiduous effort and
there was nothing to indicate bad faith on their behalf.37 1
Defendant contended that the police did not do enough to locate
him as he held a job in the city for a few years, was on jury duty
twice, and faced an arrest in 1994. 373 The court stated that the
focus of defendant's due process denial is not what the officers
might have done, but rather whether their actions were
reasonable.3 74 Even if further efforts were made, a dismissal is
still not warranted since the delay "was not deliberate or
motivated by an effort to obtain a tactical advantage."3 7 Murder
is the "most serious offense recognized at law" and this
seriousness supports a finding that a delay does not deny Batiz of
due process since his escape significantly contributed to this
delay. 376
Defendant further contended that the delay caused him
prejudice because of the lack of eyewitnesses or alibi witnesses
361 163 Misc. 2d 237, 620 N.Y.S.2d 227 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1994),
aff'd, 227 A.D.2d 219, 642 N.Y.S.2d 269 (1st Dep't 1996).369 Batiz, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 14, 1997, at 24.
370 Id. In Guzman, the court concluded that the forty-nine month delay
deprived the defendant of due process and warranted dismissal of the
indictment. Guzman, 163 Misc. 2d at 244, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 232.
37 Batiz, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 14, 1997, at 24.
372 Id.
373 Id.
374 Id.
371 Id. (citation omitted).
376 Id. (citation omitted).
976 [Vol 14
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due to the death of many of the investigators, thereby limiting his
cross examination at trial.3" The court agreed that Batiz may
have endured some prejudice caused by the delay, but since the
delay was abundantly due to his own actions, a "general
unspecified claim of prejudice" does not provide a basis to
dismiss the indictment.3 3
In comparing the federal case and state cases relied on by the
Batiz court, the application of the law in a preindictment delay
are congruous. Both federal and state cases conclude that
although some prejudice exists against the defendant due to the
lapse of time in prosecuting a case, such delay may not deprive
the defendant of due process.
Ramanadhan v. Wingem
(decided August 12, 1997)
This Article 78 proceeding involves a due process challenge
under both the Federalu and the New York Staten' Constitutions,
where a professional's reputation and livelihood were deprived by
State action taken prior to the availability of a hearing."'
3nId.
11 Id. (citing People v. Andine, 214 A.D.2d 373, 624 N.Y.S.2d 594 (lst
Dep't 1995)). In Andine, defendant appealed his conviction for assault,
contending that the preindictment delay of four years and seven months
deprived him of due process. Id. at 373, 624 N.Y.S.2d at 595. The court
dismissed the indictment since the People failed to show that diligent efforts
were made to locate the defendant. Id. at 374-75, 624 N.Y.S.2d at 596. They
were in possession of the defendant's photograph, they knew his aliases and
his whereabouts, and, nonetheless, closed the case after six weeks. Id.
174 Misc. 2d 11, 662 N.Y.S.2d 393 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1997).
o U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in
pertinent part: "INlor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.... ." Id.
311 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This provision of the New York State
Constitution provides in pertinent part: "[N]o person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law." Id.
382Ramanadhan, 174 Misc. 2d at 24, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 404. Here, a Special
Administrative Hearing before the New York State Department of Social
1998 977
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